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DO BUSINESS AND LAW MIX?
MAURICE REULER*
of the Denver Bar

"It is not necessarily improper for a lawyer to engage in a
business, but he must conduct it in a manner not inconsistent with
the Canons."'
The foregoing statement, as will be seen upon perusal, would
leave one with the inference that while there is nothing per se
wrong with a lawyer engaging in commercial enterprise, still such
a lawyer would be bound to exercise a greater degree of care in the
conduct of such an enterprise than would the ordinary businessman. The subsequent opinions based upon Canon 27,2 which is the
one prohibiting advertising, direct and indirect, all bear out the
thought that while a lawyer may own a business, still he must
separate and place a wall between his business self and his legal
self in order that his legal self will be, like Casesar's wife, above
suspicion. The problem presented by Canon 27 is like all other
moral questions, a matter of degree.
For example, it is provided that it is not improper for an
attorney to accept employment as a claim adjuster from a corporation which adjusts claims, and then also to represent it in litigation. 3 The rationale given here is that the employment as a claim
adjuster did not exploit the lawyer's professional services, nor did
the lawyer share his professional earnings with the corporation.
However, the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances
has also ruled that it is unethical for an attorney to participate in
either legal or collection activities of a business in which he has a
financial interest, although the lawyer may own such interest in
the agency if he does not participate therein, and nothing is done
to create the impression that the agency enjoys the benefit of the
attorney's advice. 4 The Committee stated:
We are of the opinion that a practicing lawyer cannot participate
in the collection activities or the management of an agency which
solicits the collection of claims. If a lawyer is to participate in such
activities, he must withdraw from the practice and refrain from
holding himself out as a lawyer.5

The committee has also ruled that it is improper for an attorney who does nothing but adjusting, to have his name appear on
law firm stationery as adjuster, and on the door of the firm as adThe author wishes to express his thanks to Messrs. William Sackmann and
Robert Gee. both of the Denver bar, for their constructive suggestions and assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1 OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, American

Bar Association (1947) Canon 27, Opinion 57, p. 150.
Ibid.
'Ibid, Opinion 96, p. 208.
4 Ibid., Opinion 225, p. 447.
5 Supra, Opinion 225, p. 449.
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juster, who in case of suit, recommends the firm upon whose stationery, and upon whose door his name appearsY
It will be noted that there appears to be some inconsistency in
the opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances in that it is proper under their rulings for an attorney to
adjust and prosecute a claim if an adjustment fails, while, on the
other hand, it is improper for an attorney to operate an adjustment
business from a law office where his name appears on the door and
on the law firm stationery as adjuster, and he recommends the
firm in case of suit. The inconsistency, like so many inconsistencies of law, is more illusory than real when we consider the basic
reason for the rule. The foundation for the rulings on this branch
of professional ethics appears to hinge on a determination of the
question: Is the commercial pursuit of the lawyer used as a means
of indirect solicitation for his professional life? If the attorney
engaging in a business uses that business indirectly to solicit professional employment, he is violating Canon 27.1
DEMARCATION OF CONDUCT DIFFICULT

All of us would recognize the clear violation of the particular
provision of the code of ethics here under consideration. There is
no doubt that an attorney could not advertise an abstracting business with his name prominently displayed as attorney at law
immediately thereunder, but, as in so many situations, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain where the clear violation ends, and the
proper conduct of a non-professional enterprise begins.
There have been a few cases which have considered this question. In one of them, an attorney sent out 5800 postcards under
the name "Libarian Tax Service." These cards contained statements that this tax service had a competent staff well able to take
care of income tax problems, and was under the direction of
Stephen Libarian. Mr. Libarian's law office was located in Los
Angeles, where he maintained large signs stating that free parking was available, and further informing the public that Stephen
Libarian was an attorney. The court in condemning all of these
practices held that the purpose of the postcards was the solicitation of legal business, and that the gentleman's activities merited
a one-year suspension from the bar."
In another situation, an attorney was employed by a collection agency as office girl and stenographer at the munificent salary
of $80 per month. Her contract further provided that she could
engage in the private practice of law, and was to rtceive from the
collection agency $5 and $10 per judgment collected by them. The
members of the agency completed all forms preparatory to instituting suit on any case sent to them. The respondent signed the
'Ibid., Opinion 214, p. 427.

'Ibid.
'Libarian

v. State Bar of California, 25 Calif. 2d 314, 153 P.

2d 739 (1944).
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papers and proceeded to take them to court. This attorney was
found guilty of professional misconduct in lending her name to an
organization which was engaged in the unauthorized practice of
lawY So, also, was an attorney the subject of censure where he
organized a legitimate collection agency with offices located in several states, but the letterheads of which agency contained his name
as attorney, giving, so the court felt, the impression that he was
licensed to practice in all of the states in which the collection office
was located, when, in fact, he was licensed only in New York. 10
An interesting situation arose in Minnesota. Here, the respondent attorney was employed as vice-president of a bank at an
annual salary. The terms of the contract with the bank provided
that he was to be permitted to practice law, but he agreed to turn
over all fees received to the bank. The respondent sent out his
opinions on bank stationery, although he conducted his legal business in a separate room. The court, in ruling on this matter, held
that the conduct of the attorney amounted to the corporate practice of law, and the respondent was severely censured. 1 Another
enterprising Minnesota lawyer was engaged in the real estate
business, sometimes for himself, and sometimes for others. The
court said that the attorney must exercise a higher degree of care
than that
exercised by laymen in the conduct of their private
12
affairs.
DOING PROPER ACTION IMPROPERLY

In all the cases cited, it appears that the attorney, although
doing that which would be normally proper, by his method of operation made it improper. Many attorneys, as we know, do engage
in some non-professional side line of a commercial nature, and it
is difficult to know when they may be unconsciously stepping near
the line of a violation of Canon 27. It is perfectly clear that an
attorney could not engage in a business pursuit which would conflict as such with his legal profession. For instance, it would be
highly improper, it seems to the writer, for an attorney, if he
were also a real estate broker, to sell a piece of property and then
in the very next breath, examine the abstract to the property.
However, the problem tends to shade more to the gray when we
examine the situation of an attorney who has his desk in a real
estate office, but has no financial connection with it. In such a
case, where a piece of property is sold by the real estate broker,
that broker recommends the attorney as the proper person to
examine the abstract . Whether or not the attorney is violating
the Canons of Professional Ethics in the above example is rather
hard to ascertain. The writer queried several of his brethren at
Yount v. Zarbell, 17 Wash. 2d 278, 135 P. 2d 309 (1943).
Application of J. W. Roe Co., Inc. in re Schwartz, 181 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1920).
"In
re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930).
"In re Waleen, 190 Minn. 13, 250 N. W. 798 (1933).
10
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the bar, and they expressed practically an equal division of opinion
as to whether or not the attorney should accept the abstract. It is
the opinion of the writer that there is nothing improper in the
above situation, but that, as in the case of a trustee, the burden
would be on the attorney to prove the fairness of his transactions
if a question were raised.
MASS. CASE SHEDS A LITTLE LIGHT

Perhaps the best reasoned case which was found is In Re
Thibodeau.13 Here, the respondent, a duly licensed attorney and
a partner in a prominent law firm, organized what he called the
"Automobile Legal Association." This association had a sales manager and a good many salesmen, with principal offices located in
New England, New York and New Jersey. The association advertised continuously. For an annual fee, among the services which
they provided were road, garage, and an emergency medical aid in
case of accident. Their articles of agreement provided further
that they would aid in the procurement of bail bonds, and that if
a member were charged with drunk or reckless driving, or with
manslaughter, they would pay the fee, within certain set limits, of
the attorney hired to defend the member. The association also
agreed to pay the fee of any attorney hired by a member in case of
property damage actions brought against the customer. The association furnished a list of attorneys to its members, but specifically
stated therein that the members need not hire these attorneys.
The attorneys' list also contained the statement that the association did not hold itself out as qualified to practice law. On the
attorneys' list were the names of the respondent's partner, as well
as a partner's son. The offices of respondent's firm were located
next door to the Automobile Legal Association. There was, howewer, no adjoining entrance to the two suites. The evidence produced indicated that occasionally, members of the service organization went into the law office of respondent's partners; s',me few
of them became clients. The court in considering the problems
raised by the above situation ruled:
(a) It cannot be doubted that the solicitation by a lawyer of
employment in legal matters by means of salesmen and advertising
here disclosed, would be a gross impropriety which would at once
subject him to discipline. On the other hand, commonly, a member
of the Bar is free to engage in commercial pursuits of an honorable
character, and to advertise and to extend his purely mercantile
busi4
ness honestly and fairly by ordinary commercial methods.
(b) In our opinion, the business conducted by the respondent
under the name of the Association is not the practice of law. The
respondent performs none of the legal work for which the Association
pays. He does not employ the lawyers who do the work. He does
not direct or control them. All the respondent does is to furnish a
1"295 Mass. 374, 3 N. E.
". Supra, p. 750.

2d 749 (1936).
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list of competent attorneys which subscribers mayuse if they desire,
and to pay such attorneys as subscribers employ. Any layman could
lawfully do these things . . . As the respondent's business, conducted
under the name of the Association, is not the practice of law, it follows
that the solicitation of subscribers and the presentation to the public
of the advantages of the Association are not, in themselves, improper.' 5
(c) [As to members of respondent's law firm] this presents a
situation of some delicacy which could easily become the subject of
abuse. Confining ourselves strictly to the facts found, however, we
incline to the opinion that no present impropriety is shown. It does
not appear that the respondent's law firm derives any direct advantage
in its practice from the Association business of the respondent, or
that the Association is conducted with that end in view. The Association business is a genuine business. There is nothing to indicate
that the precautions taken to separate the Association from the law
firm are not real, or that they cover any subterfuge. Any indirect
profit or advantage which the firm receives from the publicity given
the Association is very small and incidental, and, apparently, no
greater than that which any firm of lawyers might receive through
the connection of its members with substantial business enterprises
such as banks or insurance companies, or through its members, doing
business as trustees, receivers, or in like capacity. It has never been
thought improper for a lawyer to extend his acquaintance, or to enhance his prestige in these ways, even though it has a tendency to
bring him to the attention of possible clients and thus to increase
his law practice.'"

It will be noted that the court in the foregoing opinion, first
states the general rule that it is perfectly proper for an attorney
to be associated in a business enterprise so long as the enterprise
does not entail, nor serve as an entree toward getting new clients
for the attorney participating therein. The test in determining
whether, in a given instance, the attorney's activities come within
the ban is pragmatic. The court says the business is genuine, and
any benfits which come to the attorney's law firm are indirect.
The court leaves plain, however, the inferences that the attorney
may become guilty of a violation of professional ethics if he does
not conduct himself in relation to his two interests with the utmost
propriety.
ONLY ONE COLORADO CASE

There is, so far as the writer could discover, only one Colorado case which bears on the point at issue. It would seem to follow the test laid down by the Massachusetts court.1 7 A Colorado
state senator was found guilty of unprofessional conduct, when
as an attorney, he accepted retainers from certain insurance companies which were being investigated by a committee of which he
was chairman in the state senate.' 8 The court points out that it
is no violation of ethics for a state senator to practice law. The
violation lay in his combination of the jobs.
"Supra, pp. 751-752.
," Supra, p. 752.
,In re Thibodeau, supra, n. 13.
" People v. Nolan, 100 Colo. 275, 67 P. 2d 76 (1937).

100
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In attempting to draw a conclusion from the cases and opinions, it would seem that in order to avoid a violation of Canon 27,
the attorney must first be sure that his non-professional enterprise is not a mode whereby he engages in indirect solicitation for
clients, and second, that, as an attorney, he is not the arm of some
lay organization which through him, is, in effect, practicing law.
In summary, it is submitted that any attorney may engage
in a commercial enterprise without fear of violating Canon 27, provided such enterprise is kept entirely separate from his legal life,
and provided that he acts with the highest degree of rectitude in
the conduct of his business enterprise.

WILLFUL WAYS
The following clauses appear in a will uncovered by John G.
Reid and Jean S. Breitenstein of Denver. For "reasons of delicacy"
the names and dates have been-changed, and we leave it to you and
Hu as to whether or not they should be included in the model will:
* * * Third, I give, devise and bequeath to Mariposa Maria Ruperta
Sanchez, widow of the late Ricardo Garcia and her and my children,
Luisita, born August 12, 1928, Estrellita, born Sept. 29, 1931, Ricardo
born June 30, 1934 and Ruperto, born December 1, 1937 the other onehalf of all my real and personal property after the payment of my debts
and the expenses of administration, the said parties to share equally in
said amount and in the event that after this date, and within nine
months after my death there shall be born to said Mariposa Maria
Ruperta Sanchez any child or children, then said child or children to
share equally in said one-half of property as fully as those hereinbefore
by name mentioned.
* * * Seventh, in the event, that said Leopold Sachs should decline
to serve as such executor, then I hereby authorize him to nominate and
select some fit and proper person to serve as such executor and ask the
Court to appoint the person so selected, excluding the following named
persons from his selection: Win. H. Stein, Jesus F. Stein, John Thomas,
Nathan Baer and George E. Westerbay. As I herein have requested,
that a copy of this my last will and testament be sent to my sister,
Fraulein Malivine Gross, I deem it necessary, to state here that I am
not married to the herein mentioned Mariposa Maria Ruperta Sanches
and to state also, that I, at no time have made to her any promise of
marriage. I deem these statements necessary so to avoid creating in
my sister's mind the belief that I have tried to deceive her in regards
to my personal affairs or relations as I, for reasons of delicacy, due her
sex and position and out of respect to her, never informed her of the
existence of these my children for all of whom I hereby bespeak her
good will and some part of that affection which she, at all times, has so
unlimitedly bestowed upon me and I add at the same time the request,
that she may not, from the nature of the relations existing between me
and the mother of these children, be brought to form a hasty, prejudiced
and therefor unjust judgment of and against the said Mariposa Maria
Ruperta Sanches and I also pray her, my sister's forgiveness for having
omitted to inform her previously of the existence of these children, my
reasons for this I have now here stated. * * *

